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Pfeiffer: Commercial Law

COMMERCIAL LAW
I. UNDER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE A CONTRACT MAY INCLUDE
TERMS OF THE ACCEPTANCE THAT WERE DIFFERENT FROM OR

ADDITIONAL TO THE TERMS OF THE OFFER

In Weisz Graphics Division v. Peck Industries' the South Carolina
Court of Appeals settled a "battle of forms" by applying section 2-207
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).2 The court relied primarily on
the parties' course of dealings and trade usage and held that the delivery
term in the seller's standard acceptance form became part of the parties'
sales contract.' The court implied that both "different" and "additional"
terms contained in a confirmation or acceptance may become part of a
contract under UCC section 2-207(2).!
Weisz Graphics ("Weisz") manufactures custom graphic materials
for a variety of national customers. Weisz typically manufactures and
ships the graphics to customers upon completion of the order, however,
Weisz occasionally contracts to sell under release arrangements. 5 Peck
Industries ("Peck") manufactures commercial signs and had been a
customer of Weisz since 1985. Some of Peck's previous contracts with
Weisz were for immediate delivery while other contracts were for release
shipment. None of Peck's previous release contracts extended beyond
one year in duration.6
Peck sent a purchase order to Weisz on April 8, 1986, specifying
that the graphics were "TO BE BILLED AND SHIPPED AS RELEASED."' The purchase order contained no other shipping information. Weisz immediately confirmed Peck's order by mailing to Peck an
"Acknowledgement of Order" that contained the shipping term "On

1.
2.
3.
4.

304 S.C. 101, 403 S.E.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1991).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-207 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Weisz Graphics, 304 S.C. at 107, 403 S.E.2d at 149.
See id.

5. Id. at 102-03, 403 S.E.2d at 147. Under a release arrangement, Weisz

produces a customer's entire order at one time, but instead of shipping the entire
order upon completion, Weisz warehouses the merchandise until the customer

requests shipment of specified lots. Weisz bills the customer as the goods are
shipped. A release arrangement allows customers to achieve the benefit of economies
of scale in production and to protect against price increases. Release arrangements
are generally limited in the industry to a one-year period. Id.
6. Id. at 103-04, 403 S.E.2d at 150.
7. Id. Peck actually sent the order to the Decker Company, a manufacturer's

representative in Memphis, on April 7. Decker forwarded the order to Weisz on
April 8. Id.
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Releases over 12 Months.' Weisz completed Peck's order by early June
1986 and warehoused the decals for future shipment. Peck requested and
Weisz released seven shipments during, the next twelve months. At the
end of twelve months, however, Weisz demanded payment for the
remaining unshipped graphics and refused to release any additional
shipments until Peck paid for the remaining goods. Peck refused to pay
and filled its requirements from another supplier. Weisz subsequently
brought an action under the UCC for the unpaid balance of the order. 9
The trial court entered judgment for Weisz in the amount of $80,935.97
plus interest, and Peck appealed."1
The court of appeals began its analysis with UCC section 2-709,
which provides:
When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller
may recover... the price... (b) of goods identified to the contract
if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a
reasonable price or the circumstances indicate that such effort will
be unavailing."
The court held that the goods in question were identified to the contract.'" The court next examined the issue of failure to pay when due.
Peck argued on appeal that the twelve-month shipment term was not
a part of the contract and that payment was not due because Peck had not
requested shipment of the remaining goods. 3 However, the court held
that the twelve-month delivery term was part of the contract based on the
parties' course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade.14

8. Id. at 104, 403 S.E.2d at 148.
9. Id. at 104-05, 403 S.E.2d at 147. Weisz's lawsuit actually involved three
purchase orders by Peck for custom graphics, but the court's analysis centered on the
largest of the three. See id. at 104-05, 403 S.E.2d at 147-48.
10. Id. at 102, 403 S.E.2d at 147.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-709 (Law. Co-op. 1976), construed in Weisz
Graphics, 304 S.C. at 105, 403 S.E.2d at 148.
12. Weisz Graphics,304 S.C. at 105,403 S.E.2d at 148 (citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-501(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
• 13. Id. at 105-06, 403 S.E.2d 148. Peck argued that the delivery term should be
three years, the period that Peck considered to be a "reasonable time" pursuant to
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-309 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Weisz Graphics,304 S.C. at 106,
403 S.E.2d at 148.
14. Weisz Graphics,304 S.C. at 107,403 S.E.2d at 149. Under UCC § 1-205(3)
the course of dealing between the parties and trade usage in the industry can
"supplement and qualify the terms of an agreement." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-205(3)
(Law. Co-op. 1976). Additionally, UCC § 2-208(1) provides that the course of the
parties' performance under an agreement is "relevant to determine the meaning of the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/4
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The course of dealing between the parties had been to include a twelvemonth delivery term for release sales, and the standard in the industry
was to include a twelve-month delivery term. Furthermore, Peck failed
to object to the twelve-month term in Weisz's Acknowledgement.
Accordingly, the court held that "the twelve month release period
supplemented the express provisions of the written form and was part of
the contract. "15
The court also analyzed the twelve-month release term under the
provisions of UCC section 2-207.16 Under this section, an acceptance
containing terms that are "different" or "additional" from the offer can
constitute an acceptance sufficient to form a contract. 17 Additional terms
become part of a contract between merchants under section 2-207(2)
unless "(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them...
is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received."' 8
The court found that Peck's offer was not expressly limited in its terms,
that Peck did not object to Weisz's terms within a reasonable time, and
that the twelve-month term did not constitute a material, alteration of the
terms of the offer. 9 The court held that under section 2-207(2) a term
does not constitute a material alteration of the contract if "it conformed
to existing trade usage and prior course of dealing between the parties. "2 Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment against
Peck by concluding that the twelve-month release term was part of the
contract. 21
The most interesting aspect of the Weisz Graphics opinion is the
court's interpretation of UCC section 2-207(2). Section 2-207(1) provides

agreement." S.C.

CODE ANN. § 36-2-208(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
15. Weisz Graphics, 304 S.C. at 108, 403 S.E.2d at 150.

16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-207 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Section 2-207 was enacted
to dispense with the "mirror-image" rule. Weisz Graphics, 304 S.C. at 107, 403
S.E.2d at 149. At common law the "mirror-image" rule provided that an acceptance

which contained terms different from those in the offer constituted a rejection and
counter-offer; therefore, no contract was formed. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Littlejohn,
241 S.C. 478, 129 S.E.2d 124 (1963).

17. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-207 cmt. 1 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
18. Id. § 36-2-207(2) & cmt. 3.
19. Weisz Graphics, 304 S.C. at 108, 403 S.E.2d at 150.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 108-09, 403 S.E.2d at 150. The court also held that the final
requirement of § 2-709 was satisfied because the "evidence amply supported the
circuit court's finding that any effort by Weisz to resell the goods would be
unavailing." Id. at 110, 403 S.E.2d at 151 (noting that the goods were custom-made
graphics, designed to Peck's particular specifications).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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that a contract is formed by an expression of acceptance, regardless of
the presence of "different" or "additional" terms; however, section 2207(2) states only that "additional" terms become part of a contract
between merchants unless the offer is expressly limited, the term
constitutes a material alteration, or the term is objected to.' The court
in Weisz Graphics apparently applied section 2-207(2) to resolve "the
problem of the different or additional terms. "I Nevertheless, the court's
interpretation comports with Official Comment 3 to UCC section 2207.24

Some commentators also support this interpretation of section 2-207.
Ronald Anderson states that "[it is . . . therefore to be expected that
courts will interpret UCC § 2-207 as though it said what the draftsmen
of the Code intended it to mean and conclude that it is applicable to
'additional' and also to 'different' terms."' This rationale focuses the
court's attention on the question of material alteration instead of whether
a term is "different" or simply "additional."
It is unclear from Weisz Graphics whether the twelve-month
shipping term was an "additional" term, supplying a time where the
previous order had none, or whether it was a "different" term, substituting a twelve-month term for an indefinite one. The court's failure to note
a difference belies the importance of the distinction. Nevertheless, the
determination of whether the term constitutes a material alteration of the
contract remains important.26
However, not all commentators agree with Anderson's interpretation
of section 2-207. Professor Summers clearly believes that section 2207(2) "applies only to additional terms."27 Additionally, Professor
"White supports a third interpretation. He advocates deleting both the

22. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-207 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
23. Weisz Graphics, 304 S.C. at 107, 403 S.E.2d at 149 (emphasis added).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-207 official cmt. 3 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("Whether
or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends on the
provisions of subsection (2).") (emphasis added).
25. 2 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-207:33, at 292 (3d ed. 1982).
26. See Weisz Graphics, 304 S.C. at 108-09, 403 S.E.2d at 150. This analysis
centers on both the parties' prior course of dealings and on industry custom. In Weisz
Graphics the court of appeals held that the 12-month term was not a material
alteration "[b]ecause it conformed to existing trade usage and prior course of dealing
between the parties." Id. at 108, 403 S.E.2d at 150. The court relied on Official
Comments 4 and 5 to § 2-207 in concluding that a "clause within range of trade
usage does not constitute a material alteration." Id. at 108-09, 403 S.E.2d at 150.
27.

JAMES J. WHITE

& ROBERT

S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

1-3, at 34 (3d ed. 1988).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/4
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"additional" and "different" terms, replacing them with gap-filling
provisions of the UCC.28
The Weisz Graphics court relied heavily on the parties' prior
dealings and industry trade standards, but it is unclear whether the court
was in fact relying on the "knock-out" rule because the court never
expressly called the terms in question "different" or stated that it was
using gap fillers. Although each of these three principal interpretations
of section 2-207(2) is supported by credible authority, courts should
select and adhere to a single, reasonable approach to supply predictability
to commercial transactions.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in Weisz Graphics took an
important first step in clarifying the application of a confusing and muchdebated section of the UCC. Although the court may not have completely
clarified its views, it made the law in South Carolina somewhat more
predictable. In future decisions the court should build on the foundation
it laid in Weisz Graphics and further clarify this statute.
F. Scott.Pfeiffer

28. Id.; see also Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1578-80 (10th
Cir. 1984). See generally CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS

IN CONTRACT LAw 257-60 (2d ed. 1987). This is known as the "knock-out" rule. Id.
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